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Abstract: This article argues that manipulation is negligent influence. 
Manipulation is negligent in the sense that manipulators do not chose their 
method of influence because for its potential to reveal reasons to their 
victims. Thus, manipulation is a lack of care, or negligence, exclusively 
understood exclusively in terms of how one influences. That makes the 
proposed account superior to the most influential alternative, which 
analyses manipulation disjunctively as violation of several distinct types of 
norms. The implication is a paradigm shift in understanding manipulation 
in terms of what manipulators intend to do toward a focus on what they fail 
to do or intend.  
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*** 
What is manipulation? The question has attracted much recent attention.1 
Manipulation is an arguably problematic and pervasive social phenomenon.2 It 
thrives in close relationships, perpetuated even by those who otherwise abstain 
from the nefarious conduct more frequently studied by ethicists, like coercion or 
torture.3 It also plays an increasingly consequential role publicly, where deepening 
psychological insights and increasing technological sophistication allow for 
unprecedented manipulative potential in (hyper-targeted) advertising, design, 
and politics.  
 
1 Gorin 2014b; Noggle 2018b; Cohen 2018; Krstić and Saville 2019; Coons and Weber 2014b. 
2 Wood 2014; Coons and Weber 2014a; Baron 2003. 
3 Manne 2014; Noggle 1996. 




The most influential account of manipulation suggests that manipulation is 
a kind of trickery, that is, the attempt to influence someone so that they violate what 
the manipulator thinks are norms of belief, desire, or emotion (see Noggle 1996). 
This view is promising because it accounts for many paradigmatic cases of 
manipulation (as will be shown below). It is also wide enough to avoid 
counterexamples that crippled alternative accounts that explained manipulation 
in terms of hidden influence, autonomy subversion, or the bypassing of 
rationality.4  
However, the view that manipulation is trickery fails where it matters most. 
The trickery account fails to provide a unified account of the norms that 
manipulation arguably undermines. Several paradigmatic cases of manipulation 
– pressuring tactics, the 'hijacking' of someone's proper functioning, and 
paternalizing nudges – do not involve trickery. The trickery account can be 
broadened to include both norms applicable to the manipulatee (e.g. to adopt 
reasonable beliefs) and norms applicable to the manipulator (e.g. beliefs honest 
intentions in influencing others) to explain these cases. But then the account loses 
its simple elegance and, more importantly, it mischaracterises manipulation as 
aiming at violating those norms, when the violation of those norms is a mere side 
effect of manipulation. 
Therefore, I introduce and defend a simpler and yet more adequate account 
of manipulation. Accordingly, manipulation is analysed in terms of the 
manipulator's grounds for choosing a particular means of influence. Manipulators 
 
4 Noggle 1996, 2018a; Gorin 2014b; Barnhill 2016; Mills 2014; Sunstein 2016; Cholbi 2014; 
Baron 2014; Hanna 2015; Klenk 2021.  




are negligent about whether their influence reveals reasons to the manipulatee. 
Violating a norm about the appropriate intention behind interpersonal influence 
is thus shown to be necessary and sufficient for manipulation. The resulting 
account also explains why manipulation can be unintentional, and it provides a 
superior basis for (empirically) measuring and normatively evaluating 
manipulation than the trickery account. 
I will proceed as follows. Section I briefly recaps the trickery account of 
manipulation and Section II presents three important counterexamples to the 
view. Section III draws two important implications, which have gone unnoticed in 
the literature and which motivate the search for an improved account. Section IV 
presents and defends the novel negligence view of manipulation. Section V spells 
out implications for (morally) evaluating manipulation and assessing it 
empirically.  
1 Manipulation as trickery 
The view of manipulation as trickery says that manipulative action is the attempt 
to get someone's beliefs, emotion, or desire fall short of the ideals that in the view 
of the influencer govern the target's beliefs, emotions, or desires (Noggle 1996).5  
On the trickery view, and to stick with Noggle's helpful metaphor, 
manipulation is the adjustment of "psychological levers" away from what the 
manipulator thinks are ideal settings for the target. Noggle writes (1996, 44): 
 
5 The trickery account is very influential and – in basic outline - accepted by several 
commentators in the current debate (e.g. Baron 2003, 2014; Coons and Weber 2014b). Deviators 
focus on small additions. For example, Barnhill (2014) accepts the trickery view with the slight 
modification that manipulation must hurt the manipulatee's self-interest. And while Mills (1995) 
defends a narrower version of the trickery view she expands her view to match Noggle's account in 
later works (Mills 2014). 




There are certain norms or ideals that govern beliefs, desires, and emotions. 
Manipulative action is the attempt to get someone's beliefs, desires, or 
emotions to violate these norms, to fall short of these ideals. 
What norms matter? The relevant norms or ideals are the ones that the 
manipulator envisions for the manipulatee. This retains a parallel with deception 
(where it matters what the deceiver takes to be the truth, from which he deviates), 
and it avoids the potential problem of committing to and identify objective norms 
that govern belief, desires, or emotions.6 Thus, the trickery view classifies 
manipulation as an "intentionally characterised" action (Noggle 1996) and 
specifies it quite broadly in terms of attempting one's victim to violate some belief, 
desire, or emotion-related norm. In effect, the breadth of the different norms for 
emotions, beliefs, and desire that we recognise gives the account tremendous 
breadth and explanatory power. Thus, the trickery account avoids the mistake of 
trying to shoehorn manipulation into the mould of necessary violation of some 
allegedly more basic capacity or process.7 
The trickery view requires that the manipulator aims, attempts, or intends 
to have the manipulatee violate these norms, though it is not clear how to 
characterise these notions precisely in the context of manipulation. There are two 
main questions. First, is the aim, attempt, or intention to make the manipulatee 
adopt a faulty mental state? Or simply to make the manipulatee adopt a particular 
mental state? Moreover, can one follow an aim without being, in the moment, 
consciously aware of it and thus 'accidentally' manipulate? Must a manipulator 
 
6 Though, of course, that depends a lot on one’s metaethical predilections. Hanna 2015 thinks 
that objective norms are the relevant ones for manipulation, though Noggle 1996 already suggests 
powerful arguments against that view.  
7 Compare the discussion of accounts that define manipulation in terms of hidden influence, 
deception, autonomy-undermining, or rationality subversion and the relevant counterexamples in 
Gorin 2014b and Klenk 2021. 




have the norm violation she aims for explicitly in mind, and thus be able in the 
first place to understand what norms and ideals govern her victim? The trickery 
account does not give answers to these questions, though they seem relevant in 
light of recent arguments that suggest that unintentional or at least unconscious 
manipulation is possible (Baron 2014; Manne 2014). I shall return to these points 
below.  
2 Trickery is not necessary for manipulation 
First, it is helpful to discuss some salient counterexamples to the trickery account.  
 Pressuring  
Pressuring tactics like charming, peer pressure, or guilt tripping appear 
manipulative but cannot easily be explained by the trickery account.8 At least, it 
is not obvious which norms or ideal a manipulator who uses pressuring tactics 
aims to violate. Two examples illustrate the point. Consider:  
Emotional blackmail. Mark is a horrible cook, as Carola begun to 
understand after being married to him for years. Like in everything else in 
their relationship, he does not take rejection lightly. At lunch, he tells her 
"Eat the food I cooked for you or I will hurt myself."  
Peer pressure. Taylor seeks a cheap place to stay in an expensive city and 
ends up in a fraternity with a heavy drinking culture. He abhors drinking, 
but feels that he must participate to keep his place in the frat house.  
 
8 As will be clear later, I think that there is indeed a more basic phenomenon, or common 
factor, that explains why these seemingly different cases of manipulation are cut from the same 
cloth.  




Both cases seem like paradigmatic cases of manipulation. In both cases, 
however, it is false that the manipulator aims to make the manipulatee's beliefs, 
emotions or desires fall short of some ideal. The emotional blackmailer does not 
aim at changing the manipulatees beliefs 
Unless proponents of the trickery account can reveal relevant norms that the 
manipulator intends to undermine, both cases are counterexamples to the view 
that trickery is necessary for manipulation.  
One can try to make sense of pressuring cases by a disjunctive account, 
arguing that there are two distinct forms of manipulation (Baron 2003): 
manipulation as trickery, and manipulation as pressuring. Obviously, however, 
one then abandons the theoretical elegance of the trickery account that explained 
manipulation in terms of one specific intention: to make someone undermine 
norms about belief, emotion, or desire.  
Moreover, the idea of 'pressuring' would itself requires an analysis that is not 
available yet. Precisely what is going on in a case like peer pressure, for example, 
remains opaque. Thus, without a further elucidation of the norms the manipulator 
intends to undermine, it seems that pressuring cases cannot be accounted for by 
the trickery account. 
 Hijacking  
In a case of what I will call hijacking, the manipulator uses the 'proper functioning' 
of a victim's cognitive or affective to reach manipulative ends. Hijacking seems 
manipulative. For example, Gorin (2014a) has documented such cases at great 
length to combat the view that manipulation necessarily subverts or bypasses 
rational capacities. As Gorin argues, manipulation sometimes proceeds precisely 




by hijacking those rational capacities. The point applies more widely to the 
trickery account when the proper functioning of a manipulatees mental faculties 
are exploited by the manipulator. Two examples illustrate the point:  
Hijacking affect A politician is convinced by Achen and Bartels's (2016) 
claims about the irrationality of voters. He makes sexist comments to ignite 
the opposition. As intended, the opposition is angry and voices their 
concerns, much to the dismay of the politician's base and hitherto undecided 
voters. This only helps the politicians cause.  
Hijacking reason Another politician is not convinced by the irrationality 
of voters, and finds that voters are very much concerned with the saving 
environment. The politician proceeds to give good arguments for the 
protection of the environment, and she is voted into office. The politician 
herself, however, does not care about the environment themselves at all.  
Both cases seem to be cases of manipulation. However, it is false that the 
manipulators aim to make the manipulatees fall short of the ideals that govern 
their emotions or beliefs, respectively. Arguably, it is reasonable to react toward 
sexist comments with anger. Similarly, it is reasonable to accept good arguments 
for a true conclusion, if anything is.  
Therefore, both cases are counterexamples to the view that trickery is 
necessary for manipulation, unless, as before, proponents of the trickery account 
can produce norms that the manipulator attempts to undermine in these cases. 
Note that proponents of the trickery account cannot make sense of 
manipulative hijacking by invoking norms about the outcome of an interaction. 
The thought might be this. Manipulative hijacking proceeds by some however-




defined proper process (e.g. it appeals to someone’s rational capacities in a 
situation where that is required), but it may lead to outcomes that conflict with 
the ends of the manipulatee. So, the manipulator intentionally violated a norm 
about the consequences of the influence. Perhaps that is what Barnhill (2014) has 
in mind when she specifies that the condition of 'violating self-interest' must be 
part of the trickery account. As the Hijacking reason case shows, manipulation 
may sometimes lead to outcomes that are norm-compliant from the manipulatees 
perspective as well as from an objective standpoint (cf. Gorin 2014b, 2014a). 
 Paternalizing 
Paternalising tactics are influences where the influencer intends the person being 
influenced to adopt a mental state or perform an action that is in the interest of 
the person being influenced. Paternalising tactics are of notorious fame from the 
nudging debate (Thaler and Sunstein 2009).  
Not all nudges are manipulative. Informational nudges plausibly do not 
qualify (Noggle 2018a; Engelen and T. Nys 2020). But some nudges are 
manipulative, like as salience nudges (Noggle 2018a). Consider the following case: 
Cafeteria A school cafeteria manager is faced with a decision about how to 
arrange the food. Given his knowledge that placing certain food items in 
certain places will boost or limit consumption of the respective items, he 
decides to promote healthy foods.  
Arguably, we have here a case of manipulation. But what is the salient norm 
that the cafeteria manager aims to undermine? Per definition, paternalizing 
nudges are aimed at making their 'victims' behave in ways that are beneficial for 




them (there is some debate, immaterial for present purposes, about how the 
'victims's' self-interest is determined in nudging).9 At best, and I discuss that more 
below, the cafeteria manager accept the irrational belief-forming mechanism as a 
side effect.  
Many forms of interpersonal influence fit the schema of the pressuring, 
hijacking, and paternalizing cases just discussed. These are common tactics, and 
arguably manipulative. However, unless proponents of the trickery account can 
show which norms the users of such tactics aim to undermine, trickery (understood 
in the technical sense, as the intentional undermining of a norm for belief, desire, 
or emotion) is not a necessary condition of manipulation.  
3 Implications for the trickery account  
So far, I presented counterexamples to the view that trickery, understood as the 
intentional violation of norms for belief, emotion, or behaviour, is a necessary 
condition for manipulation. In this section, I draw two important lessons from the 
counterexamples above.  
The first lesson is that proponents of the trickery account cannot convincingly 
accommodate the counterexamples above by broadening their account by 
identifying and incorporating other types of norms that manipulation allegedly 
violates (to wit, in addition to norms that pertain to belief, emotion, or behaviour). 
The resulting theory would be, as I will show, ad-hoc and, therefore, unappealing.  
I must note that my discussion of this point cannot be exhaustive: I cannot 
discuss all possible norms that might be violated in the cases above, thus leaving 
 
9 See Engelen 2019; Engelen and T. Nys 2020; T. R. V. Nys and Engelen 2017 for helpful 
overviews over ethical issues to do with nudging that are tangential to the current debate.  




room for proponents of the trickery account to argue that their account covers the 
examples above.  
Nonetheless, the schematic discussion will already reveal that the trickery 
account would have to incorporate types of norms so different that it raises doubt 
whether the mere intention to violate any norm is characteristic or at least 
illuminating of manipulation. To elaborate, consider that in a given case of 
manipulation, proponents of the trickery account can try and find norms that the 
manipulator wanted the manipulatee to violate. Indeed, in all cases of 
manipulation, some norm is violated (as will become clear later, too). But 
proponents of the trickery account have to appeal to very different types of norms 
to explain the counterexamples above. For example, they would also have to 
invoke norms that apply to the manipulator (thus extending their account), in 
addition to the norms that apply to manipulatees (as their account suggests). I 
illustrate this through a discussion of the hijacking cases.  
In the hijacking cases, the manipulator makes the manipulatee do something 
that is norm-abiding given the manipulatee's information or situation. In order to 
account for the manipulation in the case, the proponent of the trickery account 
now needs to point to a norm that applies to the manipulatee that the manipulator 
intends to violate. But what norm could that be? One norm that could be violated 
pertains to the motivation of the influencer, the manipulator, and it invokes 
information that is not available to the manipulatee. The voters in Hijacking 
reason arguably violate a process norm about the manipulator's motives (e.g. 'do 
not act on disingenuous influences') (cf. Bělohrad 2019). Had the voters in 
Hijacking reason known about the politicians true disgust for environmental 




policies, they might not have voted for her. But this move not only broadens the 
scope of relevant norms that are relevant in an account of manipulation, it would 
also lead to vicious circularity. If Hijacking reason is a case of manipulation 
because the voters violated the norm not to act on disingenuous influences, then 
that comes close to vicious circularity: manipulation is the attempt to make 
someone violate a norm about not being manipulated. Therefore, the relevant 
norm cannot be a norm about the grounds on which one acts. Instead, the relevant 
norm must be a norm that the manipulator violates – not one that the manipulator 
intends the manipulatee to violate. Clearly, the manipulator in Hijacking reason 
manipulates a norm about abstaining from disingenuous influences. For 
proponents of the trickery account, however, that claim leads to a dilemma that 
drastically increases the scope of norms that manipulators may aim to violate. 
Either they accept that the norms that are violated are norms that apply to the 
manipulatee given full information – which is implausible – or they accept that 
the norms that are violated are norms that apply to the manipulator. That, 
however, would be a striking departure from the trickery account, which only 
refers to norms as they apply to the manipulatee. Therefore, a plausible way for 
proponents of the trickery account to deal with the counterexamples requires them 
to significantly broaden their account to include both norms that apply to the 
manipulatee (e.g. believe on good reasons) as well as norms that apply to the 
manipulator (e.g. have honest intentions).  
The second lesson suggested by the counterexamples is that the trickery 
account reflects a deeper error in thinking about manipulation. The trickery 
account operates within the paradigmatic view of manipulation as characterised 




by an intention of specific content. It erroneously focuses on what the manipulator 
intends to do. However, I suggest that manipulation, at its heart, is characterised 
by what the manipulator fails to do. Focusing on norms that the manipulator 
intends to violate may be on the wrong track for an account of manipulation. If 
instead we focus on norms that the manipulator effectively violates we retain a 
central and valuable insight of the trickery account – the relation between 
manipulation and violation of norms – and can avoid the multiplication of norms 
that the trickery account would require to make sense of the counterexamples 
above. Thus, in full generality, the association of manipulation with norm violation 
is not illuminating and the concrete proposal made by Noggle, and adopted by 
others, is too narrow.  
Instead, I suggest that the association of manipulation with norm violation 
is on the right track and that we can explain all cases of manipulation in terms of 
a single norm violation when we focus on norms that govern permissible intentions 
to influence. I illustrate this through a discussion of paternalizing cases.  
In paternalizing cases, manipulatees arguably violate norms about properly 
grounded beliefs, desires, or emotions. Manipulatees violate norms that apply to 
the grounds on which the act, think, or feel. As Noggle (2018a, 169) puts it, 
paternalizing manipulations fail to draw attention to facts that are "true and 
relevant" for the manipulatee's decision. However, it is not plausible that 
manipulators in nudging cases aim, attempt, or intend their manipulatees to 
violate such process norms. The end of paternalistic nudgers is to get manipulatees 
to perform some action, or adopt a certain mental state, not that they form a faulty 
mental state, or perform an unreasonable action. Like other manipulators, 




paternalists do not care much norms, but they care about making people act in a 
certain way. At the same time, to stick with the assumption, they act 
manipulatively, and a nudging cafeteria manager who aimed for his students to 
violate norms about how to ground ones food choices ultimately seems as 
manipulative (or not) as the one who aimed his students to eat more salad. The 
reference to norms that apply to the manipulatee is not required to explain these 
cases.  
So, the trickery account must invoke both norms that apply to the 
manipulator and norms that apply to the manipulatee and only the former are 
required to explain manipulation in the pertinent cases that make trouble for the 
trickery account. The latter norms about manipulator’s intentions are also able to 
explain other paradigmatic cases of manipulation. A parsimonious understanding 
of manipulation would can therefore do with only the latter norms and this 
suggests that we should understand manipulation exclusively in terms of a 
violation of norms about what influencers ought to intend when influencing others.  
Before spelling out the novel conception of manipulation in more detail, it is 
worth noting a dialectical point that should give further support to the account of 
manipulation developed in this paper. If the above is correct, and if trickery is 
sufficient (albeit not necessary) for manipulation, we might have to conclude that 
there are two types of manipulation: one kind of manipulation characterised in 
terms of norms about the manipulatee that the manipulator intends to violate (the 
trickery-based account of manipulation), and another kind of manipulation 
characterised in terms of norms about proper influence (which is spelled out 
below). That conclusion can be avoided in two ways. My preferred way is to show 




that there is a common factor behind both types of norm violations. This is what I 
will attempt to show in the next section. Alternatively, it could be shown that 
trickery is insufficient for manipulation. I cannot defend this latter point in detail 
in this paper, but it is worth noting that there are borderline cases that put 
pressure on the claim that trickery is sufficient for manipulation. Consider:  
Internalist manipulator Kelly is a staunch internalist about epistemic 
justification and he wants Bart to vote Biden. Unfortunately, the only 
information that Bart's other epistemic commitments (e.g. about whom to 
trust) allow Bart to process supports voting Trump. As election day 
approaches, Kelly appeals to Bart's enthusiasm for donkeys and his firm 
belief that anyone associated with donkey’s ought to be voted into office and 
so gets him to believe that Biden is the right candidate after all.  
Bart, the potential manipulatee, has a reasonable belief and wants to do the 
reasonable right thing (vote Biden, let's suppose), and there is ample evidence for 
supporting Biden (let's suppose), even if it is not available to Bart. The trickery 
view would classify this case as a case of manipulation. From Kelly’s internalist 
perspective, Bart violates a norm for belief when he believes that Biden is the right 
candidate. Nonetheless, I am unsure as to whether Kelly manipulated Bart. 
Irrespective of the sufficiency of trickery for manipulation, I will suggest that there 
is a deeper underlying phenomenon in the next section.  
4 Manipulation as negligent influence  
I have argued that the most promising and most developed account of 
manipulation, the view that manipulation is trickery, fails. I will now defend a 




superior alternative. Manipulation can be understood satisfactorily and 
exclusively in terms of norms about the manipulatee's intentions about the means 
or method of influence. The account I develop thus switches the 'domain' of norms 
that a manipulator violates from norms as they apply to the manipulatee to norms 
as they apply to the manipulator. This account maintains a central insight of the 
trickery account – that manipulation concerns the violation of norms about desire, 
belief, or emotion – but it is more explanatorily powerful in identifying a single 
norm that all manipulation cases violate.  
Common to all cases of manipulation is the negligence of the manipulator, 
where 'negligence’ is a used as a (to be defined) term of art. The manipulator is 
negligent in that he or she does not care whether or not her chosen means of 
influence help her victim to adequately assess her situation. There is such a norm 
of ‘care’ in interpersonal interaction. That is the norm that manipulators violate. 
In other words, the manipulator does not care whether her chosen means of 
influence reveals reasons to the manipulatee.  
Of course, we have already seen that manipulators sometimes hijack their 
victims's capacities and thus they expressly appeal to reasons to make their 
victims behave, feel, or think as desired. Manipulators, however, are not 
ultimately motivated by the reason-revealingness of their method of influence but 
rather by the fact that it is an effective method to get them what they want. That 
is, I propose that manipulators violate the following conditional:  
Negligence I: Had a method of influence not revealed reasons for doing x 
to subject S, then S’s influencer would have chosen a different method.  




The negligence conditional is motivated by considerations about the nature 
of persuasion, and manipulation is understood in relation to persuasion. Like all 
social influences, persuasion is aimed at change (in someone's behaviour, thought, 
desires, etc.). Its characteristic feature, I argue, is that it finally aims at reasonable 
change, that is, change grounded in an appreciation of reasons. A persuader aims 
at change in the interlocutor insofar as the interlocutor makes that change based 
on an understanding of his or her reasons for doing so.  
Coercer, similarly, care a great deal about reasons. They care to identify good 
reasons for their victims to do as they please. A credible and efficient coercive 
threat will provide good reason for the victim to follow suit. A threat that does not 
give them reason to follow suit will not be effective in coercion. Of course, unlike 
persuaders, coercers do not care about reasonable change per se.  
Compared to persuasion and coercion, manipulation appears furthest away 
from reasonable influence (to wit, an influence aimed at or dependent on there 
being reasons for the outcome the manipulator wants to effect). We can 
understand manipulation without talking about reason at all. A persuader has 
reasons in mind, and tries to reveal them to the interlocutor. A coercer, similarly, 
relies on there being good reasons for the effect he wants to create by coercion 
(Schelling 1997). In contrast, a manipulator never is concerned with reason as a 
final end. Sometimes, showing you that you indeed have reasons to do what the 
manipulator wants is the most effective way for the manipulator to achieve her 
aims. But she does not pursue the revealing of reasons as a final end. Manipulation 
indeed lies between these extremes, as earlier writes have suggested (Beauchamp 
1984; Faden and Beauchamp 1986).  




The account of manipulation is not complete yet. Using any method that 
necessarily reveals reasons to the manipulatee will ensure that one cannot 
manipulate. For example, imagine you are connected to Mr Spock and your only 
means of influencing him is through written proofs. Such proofs necessarily count 
as reason revealing for Mr Spock, and so you cannot manipulate Mr Spock at all. 
But that seems wrong. Hijacking cases have shown that you could use adequate 
processes for nefarious outcomes. To capture this, I propose the following second 
condition: 
Negligence II: Had the influencer chosen a method of influence M, M would 
have revealed reasons to subject S.   
Thus, manipulation is careless influence in the sense that manipulative 
action is characterised by the violation of Negligence I and Negligence II: 
Manipulative action: M intends to manipulates S iff M violates 
Negligence I or Negligence II.  
There are some important differences to the trickery account. First, the 
negligence account makes it straightforward to account for pressuring, 
paternalising, and hijacking tactics. In all three, manipulators do not chose their 
method of influence to induce change based on a proper understanding of the 
situation, but they chose whatever method works best to induce that change (they 
will still instrumentally care about reasons, though unlike a coercer). The 
carelessness gives us a unified account of manipulation. The norms that matter 
for understanding manipulation are norms about how one ought to go about 
influencing others or, more concretely, norms about legitimate means of influence. 




What these norms legislate will depend on the attributes of the person one is 
trying to influence.  
The account of manipulation as careless influence preserves a conceptual 
analogy between manipulation and bullshitting (in Frankfurt's technical sense). 
Bullshitting is characterised as a lack of regard for the truth of one's assertions 
(or implications thereof). It contrasts with truthful assertion and deception (Fallis 
2010). Fallis suggests that deception, and bullshitting, must be understood as 
including a reference to a context such that deception and deception requires a 
context where truthful assertion is expected. I am not sure whether such 
contextualising is needed in the case of manipulation, at least when it comes to 
identifying manipulation. It seems that you manipulate when you are careless in 
your influence (i.e. you violate Negligence I and Negligence II), independently of 
whether you are in a context where influencing requires no reason revealing. 
Lovers can manipulate, and parents, as do bantering friends. Often, the contexts 
where such interactions will take place will not require reason revealing, and yet 
it seems reasonable to allow that these influence (insofar as they are careless) are 
manipulative. It rather seems that unlike deception, which carries a stronger 
moral undertone, bullshitting and manipulation are more alike because you can 
do either independently of the context. There does seem to be a contextualised 
element of manipulation nonetheless: but it concerns its evaluation rather than 
the identification question, as I discuss in section 5.  
A further interesting feature of the account of manipulation as negligent 
influence is the fact that it allows for unintentional or at least unconscious 
manipulation. As Baron (2014) and Manne (2014) suggest, as well as several 




others who recognise the manipulativeness of guilt trips (cf. Noggle 2018b), it 
seems that some actions can be manipulative even though they are perpetrated 
without the express aim to have someone violate some norm or ideal. The 
carelessness account makes sense of this. These are cases where people do not try 
hard enough to be persuasive, they just don't' care: they sulk, charm, and pressure 
because they are, consciously or unconsciously, consumed by a need to get what 
they want. There is a popular image that manipulation is artful influence. That is 
true in that those who unintentionally manipulate are skilful or effective in 
getting others to do what they want, but they are not therefore purposeful in 
planning out their scheme. 
The view of manipulation as careless influence retains much of appeal behind 
the trickery account and indeed it can be seen as a development of it. Before 
outlining how it helps us toward a better base of measuring and evaluating 
manipulation, I need to address a complication and an objection.  
The complication concerns a crucial but unclear and potentially controversial 
term at the heart of the carelessness account. What is reason revealing? Anything 
that helps an agent act (or think, or feel) to be reason responsive. This means that 
the agent is helped to conduct herself in ways that are supported by reasons and 
that she does so because she recognises those reasons. Reason revealing is, as it 
were, an internalist notion: something that is reason revealing helps an agent 
conduct herself in a reason supported way by responding to those reasons. It is 
still unclear what 'helping' means, but that can be understood in terms of an 
increased likelihood for the agent to be responsive to those reasons. So, attempting 
to pick a reason revealing method is thus just the attempt to influence the other 




in such a way – through words, a picture, an insinuation, a display of emotion – 
that she is helped to conduct herself in ways that are supported by reasons because 
she recognises those reasons (not because she just happens to act accordingly, or 
because she does so for the wrong kinds of reasons). One might now think that 
that the carelessness account makes the basic mistake of  committing to an overly 
rationalistic picture, where only rational arguments can count as non-
manipulative (because reason-revealing) influences. But that is not so. Many 
different ways for being reason-responsive have been described in the literature, 
many of which are affective rather than cognitive in nature (cf. Fischer and 
Ravizza 1998).  
The objection concerns an alternative lessons that one might have drawn 
from studying the manipulative tactics of pressuring, paternalizing, and hijacking. 
My objection to the trickery account was that we need to introduce rather different 
types of norms to account for all these cases, some pertaining to the manipulatee 
(to wit, norms about that the manipulatee ought to do, feel, or think) and some 
pertaining to the manipulator (to wit, norms about the proper motives for 
influencing someone else). I suggested that the latter suffice. But even if that is 
true, the norms I described are not the only ones. Might we not explain 
manipulation in terms of the failure to be motivated by reasonable change? That 
is, whenever you influence someone while being negligent about whether or not 
the desired change is reasonable (for that person), then you manipulate (cf. Gorin 
2014b). The account is similar to mine – it spells out negligence in terms of the 
outcomes of an interaction, rather than the means. However, this condition should 
be resisted. For one, it is not needed in addition to the one I introduced above. 




Someone who cares about the process but not about the outcome does not seem 
manipulative. Someone who does not care about the process but about the outcome 
does seem manipulative. Second, the condition alone would have implausible 
results because it would only allow mutualistic or altruistic influence to count as 
non-manipulative. It seems perfectly possible to influence someone in a non-
manipulative way without caring about that person's ultimate ends. A marketeer 
that puts up a poster outlining the (actual) benefits of a new medication need not 
care about the ends of all people that come across the poster to avoid being 
manipulative.  
Thus, I take it that this sketch of an account of manipulation as negligent 
influence has at considerable attraction, and some clear advantages over the 
trickery account. It accounts for plausible cases of manipulation in a parsimonious 
way, including cases of pressure, and it explains how unintentional manipulation 
is possible.  
5 Implications for evaluating and assessing manipulation  
The final part of my defence of the negligence account concerns the beneficial ways 
in which the carelessness account as an answer to the identification question 
reflects on the evaluation question, i.e. the question of why, if at all, manipulation 
is morally wrong.  
Manipulation on the negligence conception is a binary affair: you either 
manipulate or you do not. But that does not mean that the evaluation of 
manipulation is binary, too. Rather, it seems plausible to invoke the idea of 
context-dependency that plays a role in the identification of deception, but now in 
the context of the evaluation of manipulation. Manipulation is morally wrong 




insofar as it violates norms that legislate persuasion over manipulation in a given 
context. Clearly, manipulation is not always morally problematic. Lovers, for 
example, may be manipulating each other legitimately and without moral residue 
(cf. Buss 2005). Also, it may be that parents are quite often manipulating their 
young children. They just want them to do something, without taking care to lay 
out their reasons. Interestingly, the manipulation as negligent influence account 
thus explains why there are norms to increasingly interact with children in 'reason 
revealing' ways as they get older. On my account, this suggests that manipulation 
is less and less morally acceptable as we interact with increasingly agential 
interlocutors. 
The negligence account may also explain why manipulation is frequently 
seen as wrong because it undermines autonomy. Though there is, arguably, no 
conceptual connection between manipulation and autonomy loss (Klenk and 
Hancock 2019), the carelessness account is well situated to explain why 
manipulation frequently (but not necessarily) leads to autonomy loss. That is 
because manipulative influences are chosen for being effective (in creating some 
change) but not necessarily for being reason revealing. If the latter is only a 
secondary thought, there is less opportunity for the manipulatee to accurately 
understand her situation and to govern her own affairs (cf. Baron 2014).  
Furthermore, the negligence account explains the intuition that 
manipulation undermines people's agency or fails to respect them as agents and, 
therefore, is morally problematic. Manipulators indeed treat manipulatees like 
objects or automatons who sometimes happen to 'run on' reasons. The negligence 
approach can account for that intuition. But unlike other proposals, who locate the 




wrong of manipulation in the failure of the manipulator to respect or care for her 
interlocutor's ends, the negligence approach is less demanding. It does not require 
that all our social influences originate in an attempt to make others or help others 
do what they have reason to do. We can want others to do something for us just 
because it is good for us. But to avoid manipulation, we should be motivated to 
influence them so that they do that because they see their reasons for it. The 
respect for someone else's agency that may make manipulation morally 
problematic is located in the failure to cater to others's reason responsiveness.  
A final consideration in favour of the negligence conception of interpersonal 
manipulation concerns its assessment. Several writers have speculated that 
manipulation may not have been a focus of much philosophical and especially legal 
attention because of its intentional nature and consequent problems with 
assessing it (cf. Sunstein 2015). The negligence conception of manipulation may 
improve the situation because it allows for a conditional analysis of manipulation. 
That, in turn, is amenable to causal modelling (Pearl, Glymour, and Jewell 2016). 
Roughly, a given interpersonal influence can be identified as manipulation if the 
(counterfactually modelled) presence of reason revealing means of influence goes 
together with the manipulator’s choice of a means of influence that is not reason 
revealing. Such causal models for the assessment of manipulation may provide 
interesting insights and shed new lights on debates within the ethics and policy of 
technology, which have often focused on questions about (technology-mediated) 
manipulation without a methodology able to further substantiate such claims.  





Interpersonal manipulation is an important and ubiquitous social phenomenon. It 
has only begun to receive sustained attention in the philosophical literature, 
driven partly by increasing concerns about technologically-mediated influences. In 
this paper, I have argued that what emerged as the most promising account of 
manipulation, the trickery view, is misguided. The trickery view suggests that a 
manipulator intends some norms that pertain to the beliefs, desires, or emotions 
of the manipulatee. However, several plausible cases of manipulation like peer 
pressure or paternalizing influences cannot be explained by the trickery account. 
I have shown that rather than trying to extend the trickery view by looking for 
further norms that manipulators may intend to violate in these cases a more 
parsimonious and explanatory powerful account explains manipulation in terms 
of negligent influence. Accordingly, manipulation is characterised by the lack of 
intention to reveal reasons to one’s interlocutor, rather than the explicit intention 
to harm one’s interlocutor (by making him or her violate some norms of belief, 
desire, or emotion). The negligence account of manipulation represents an 
important shift in our understanding of manipulation away from undue focus on 
what manipulators want toward what they fail to do.  
The present paper has aspired to demonstrate the need for and the initial 
persuasiveness of the negligence account of manipulation. Important questions 
remain. Future work should be directed at clarifying the account and spelling out 
its implications for the assessment of manipulation. Regarding the former, there 
are important open questions about the notion of reason revealing that is at the 
heart of the negligence account of manipulation and how to understand and 




demarcate different means of influence in interpersonal interaction. Regarding 
the latter, it would be interesting and fruitful to assess and demonstrate the 
strength of the negligence account in a concrete causal model of manipulation.  
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